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IN" THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, Office of
Recovery Services and
ROBYN K

A D AMS,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Case No.

S5G-ib& vJA

Priority

No.

vs.
15

MICHAEL H. MUDD,
Defendant and Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
t

I: ic s jii

§ 78-2a-3{2)u)

(Supp.

:i : t:i ::: i 1 ]::: i 1:1 : si lai i t I: : I Jt s .1 1 Code A 111 :i
1995).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES •
1.

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that there

<:. -

. "...

was entitled \

. - .

* ,h

judgment for delinquent: child support as a matter

01 law.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Utah

Code Ann. § 78-12-22

(Supp. 1995) did not bar the State of Utah

f:i : : 1 t seekii lg a ji 1 igment f> 1 1 : • :i 2] :i 1 lqi l e n t : 1 :i :i 1 I s u p ip< : :i : !::
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment presents a question of law which this Court
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
determination. See Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 892 P. 2d
1, 2 (Utah 1995); Travelers Jngmrgtpge CP, Vt Kearl, 896 P.2d 644,
646 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues of material fact, the facts and all
reasonable inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the
party

opposing

the

motion.

See

Frontier

Founds.

v.

Layton

Constr., 818 P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute of limitation has expired is a question of
law

reviewed

for correctness, with no deference

court's determination.

to the

trial

See Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P. 2d 1131

(Utah 1992); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 821 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February
approved

12, 1985, the Second Judicial District

a Petition

for Acknowledgment

Court

of Paternity, Order of

Support, and Waiver, and signed a Judgment and Order Based on
2

Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity consistent with the terms
of

Defendant's

Affidavit

Support, Consent

Acknowledging

Paternity

and

Duty

of

to Judgment and Entry of General Appearance,

signed by appellant Michael H. Mudd ("Mudd") on February 7, 1985
(R. 1 - 8) .
On October 18, 1994, the State filed an Order to Show Cause
seeking

judgment

for

a

child

support

delinquency,

which

was

served upon Mudd on October 31, 1994 (R. 10-12, 16) .
On December

22, 1994, Mudd

filed

a Motion

for Order

to

Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Dismiss,
alleging that the statute of limitations barred the State from
seeking a judgment (R. 53-55).

On or about January 4, 1995, the

State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (R. 64). On January 30, 1995, the District Court entered
a memorandum decision denying Mudd's motion (R. 60). On February
22,

1995,

Conclusions

the
of

District

Court

entered

Findings

Law

Order

Denying

Defendant's

and

of

Fact
Motion

and
to

Dismiss (R. 76-79).
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking a child support judgment for the
period of March 15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144).
3

On

June 20, 1995, the District Court entered a memorandum decision
granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment

(R. 133-134).

On July 19, 1995, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with the Court memorandum
decision (R. 155-160).
Appeal

(R. 161) .

On July 20, 1995, Mudd filed a Notice of

On August 7, 1995, Mudd filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
171) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides:
Within eight years an action:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of
United States or of any state or territory within
the United States.
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance
for dependent children.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35

(1992) provides:

Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the action
may be commenced within the term as limited by
this chapter after his return to the state. If
after a cause of action accrues he departs from
the state, the time of his absence is not part
of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.

4

(R. 163-

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1995), provides in part:
(1) Each payment or installment of child
or spousal support order, as defined by
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after
the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes
and effect of any judgment of a district
court, except as provided in Subsection
(2) ;
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full
faith and credit in this and in any other
jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification
by this or any other jurisdiction, except as
provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment
under a child support order may be modified
with respect to any period which a petition
for modification is pending, but only from
the date notice of that petition was given
to the obligee, if the obligor is
the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the
obligee is the petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

February

12,

approved

a

Petition

Support,

and Waiver,

Acknowledgment
of

Consent

and

Affidavit
to

the

Second

for Acknowledgment
signed

of Voluntary

Defendant's

Support,

1985,

Judicial
of

a Judgment

District

Paternity,
and

Order

Order

of

Based

on

Paternity consistent with the

Acknowledging

Judgment

and

5

Entry

Paternity
of

General

and

Court

terms

Duty

of

Appearance,

signed by appellant Michael H. Mudd ("Mudd") on February 7, 1985
(R. 1-8).

The Judgment and Order declared Mudd to be the father

of Michael Mudd Jr., born November 1, 1984, to Robyn K. Robinette
(R. 4 ) .

The Judgment and Order required Mudd to provide for the

education and other necessary expenses of the child and to pay
the amount of one hundred dollars and 00/100 ($100.00) per month
for child support until the child reaches the age of majority;
the monthly payments to be made on or before the 15th day of each
month

commencing with the month of March, 1985

Judgment

and

Order

also

awarded

two

(R. 4) .

judgments,

The

totaling

$1,600.00, for medical and hospital expenses, HL-A blood testing,
and child support arrears (R. 4 ) .
Shortly after paternity was established, Mudd left the State
of Utah (R. 76-79) .

In January 1990, Mudd was incarcerated in

the Twin Rivers Correction Center in Monroe, Washington, where he
remains incarcerated (R. 20, 42, 44, 77).
On October 18, 1994, the State filed an Order to Show Cause
seeking

judgment

for

a

child

support

delinquency,

which

was

served upon Mudd on October 31, 1994 (R. 10-12, 16) .
On December

22, 1994, Mudd

filed

a Motion

for Order

to

Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Dismiss,
alleging that the statute of limitations barred the State from
6

seeking a judgment (R. 53-55).

On or about January 4, 1995, the

State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss

(R. 64-67) .

entered

a

Dismiss

(R.

On January 30, 1995, the District

memorandum
60) .

On

decision

denying

February

defendant's

22, 1995,

the

Court

Motion

District

to

Court

entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
the State of Utah

The Court found that Mudd left

shortly after paternity was established

in

March 1985, had resided in several different states, and had been
incarcerated in the Twin Rivers Correction Center in the State of
Washington since at least June 1993.

The Court concluded that as

a result of Mudd's absence from the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-22
judgment

(1995) did not bar the State of Utah from seeking a

for

any

child

support

that

had

accrued

under

the

Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity
(R. 76-79).
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking judgment for the period of March
15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144).
the District

Court entered a memorandum

State's Motion for Summary Judgment
7

On June 20, 1995,

decision granting the

(R. 133-134).

On July 19,

1995, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order consistent with the Court's memorandum decision
(R. 155-160) .

On July 20, 1995, Mudd filed a Notice of Appeal

(R.

August

161). On

7,

1995,

Mudd

filed

a

Memorandum

in

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 163).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (Supp. 1995) provides for an eight
year statute of limitation to enforce any liability due or to
become

due

for

failure

dependant children.

to provide

support

or maintenance

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35

for

(1992) provides

that a statute of limitation is tolled for the period of time
that a person is absent from the state after the cause of action
accrues.

In this

case,

it

is undisputed

that

appellant

was

absent from the State of Utah for more than five years prior to
the time this judgment was entered, having been incarcerated in
the Twin Rivers Correction Center in Monroe, Washington
42, 44, 77).
absence.

(R. 20,

The statute of limitation was tolled during his

Therefore, section 78-12-22 would not bar the State

from seeking a judgment for any support which accrued under the
Judgment

and

Order

Based

on

Paternity.
8

Acknowledgment

of

Voluntary

On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking a child support judgment for the
period of March 15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144).
Appellant failed to timely file a response to the State's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that when a motion for summary judgment is
made and properly supported, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.

If

he

does

not

so

respond,

summary

judgment,

if

appropriate, shall be entered against him.
The

trial

court

properly

determined

from

the

evidence

presented that there was no genuine issue of material fact and
the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On August

7,

1995, Mudd

untimely

filed

a Memorandum

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

in

(R. 163-

171) .
Finally, Mudd improperly raises issues on appeal that were
not ruled upon by the trial court.

This includes Mudd's Petition

to Modify Child Support, and Motion for Payment of Costs and
Fees.

It is premature for the Court to consider these issues.
9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-22 (SUPP. 1995) DID NOT BAR THE STATE OF
UTAH FROM SEEKING A JUDGMENT FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT
DELINQUENCY.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78-12-22

(Supp.

1995)

provides

the

following statute of limitation:
Within eight years an action:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of
the United States or of any state or territory
within the United States.
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance
for dependant children.
Section

78-12-22

is not

a

bar to

any action

brought

to

enforce a child support liability which accrued for a period of
eight years prior to the initiation of an action.

In this case,

the State of Utah filed its Motion for Order to Show Cause with
the

Court

limitation

on

October

would

October 5, 1986.

4,

not apply

1994.

Therefore,

to any support

the

which

statute

accrued

of

after

The only support that would be subject to the

statute of limitation would be support that accrued between March
15,

1985 and October 4, 1986, a period of approximately

1 year

and 7 months.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35

(1992) provides that a statute of
10

limitation is tolled as follows:
Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the action
may be commenced within the term as limited by
this chapter after his return to the state. If
&fter a CfrUge pf action frgqrues he departs frQm
the Statei the time pf higfrfrgengej g not Pftrt
pf the time limited fpr the commencement pf the
action.
(emphasis added).
Shortly

after

parternity

was

established,

Mudd

left

the

State of Utah (R. 76-79).

Mudd has been incarcerated in the Twin

Rivers

in Monroe, Washington,

1990

Correction

Center

(R. 20, 42, 44, 77) .

It

is well

since

established

January
in

this

jurisdiction that the time period of defendant's absence can be
added to the limitation period.
169 P. 954

(Utah 1917) .

See Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder,

In other words, the time period that

Mudd was absent from the State well exceeded 1 year and 7 months,
and therefore any past due support that accrued between March 15,
1985

and

October

4,

1986, would

statute of limitation.

11

also not

be

subject

to

the

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE EXISTED
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE STATE OF UTAH
WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
part:
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim ... may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement
of the action ... move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. ...
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A "major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the parties to
pierce
issue

the pleadings
of

fact."

to determine whether

Webster v.

Sill,

there

675 P.2d

is a genuine

1170, 1172

(Utah

1983) .
The State of Utah initiated the current support collection
action

by

judgment

serving

Mudd

for a child

with

support

a

Order

to

delinquency

Show

Cause

(R. 10-12,

seeking

16) .

In

response to the Order to Show Cause, Mudd filed a Motion for
Order to Dismiss and Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to
12

Dismiss, alleging that the statute of limitation barred the State
from seeking a judgment

(R. 53-55) .

On February 22, 1995, the

District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and

Order

Denying

Defendant's

Motion

to Dismiss.

The

Court

specifically found that as a result of Mudd's absence from the
State of Utah, section 78-12-22 would not bar the State of Utah
from seeking a judgment for any support that accrued under the
Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity
(R.

76-79).
On or about May 4, 1995, the State of Utah filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Affidavit, seeking judgment for the period of March
15, 1985 through April 30, 1995 (R. 139-144).x
In support of its motion, the State alleged that on February
12, 1985, the Second Judicial District Court approved a Petition
for Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity, Order of Support, and
Waiver, and signed a Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment
of Paternity consistent with the terms of Defendant's Affidavit
Acknowledging Paternity and Duty of Support, Consent to Judgment
and Entry of General Appearance signed by Mudd on February 7,

1

Mudd apparently received the Motion for Summary Judgment on May 8,
1995 (R. at 166).

13

1985

(R. 1 - 8 ) .

The Judgment and Order declared Mudd to be the

father of Michael Mudd Jr., born November 1, 1984, to Robyn K.
Robinette

(R. 4) .

The Judgment

and Order required Mudd

to

"provide for the education and other necessary expenses of the
child (ren)
00/100

and

to

pay

the

amount

of

one

hundred

dollars

and

($100,00) per month as and for child support... commencing

with the month of March, 1985" (R. 4 ) .
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6

(1995),

(1) Each payment or installment of child
or spousal support order, as defined by
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after
the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes
and effect of any judgment of a district
court, except as provided in Subsection
(2) ;
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full
faith and credit in this and in any other
jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification
by this or any other jurisdiction, except as
provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment
under a child support order may be modified
with respect to any period which a petition
for modification is pending, but only from
the date notice of that petition was given
to the obligee, if the obligor is given to
the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the
obligee is petitioner.
Each

payment

or

installment

of

child

support

under

the

Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary Paternity

14

became a monthly s t a t u t o r y judgment, not subject t o r e t r o a c t i v e
modification, on and a f t e r the date i t was due.
Thornblad.

849 P. 2d 1197

(Utah Ct.

App.

See Thornblad v.

1993);

Crockett

v.

Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The S t a t e of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services, has been responsible for support
in t h i s

case since i t s

inception.

Therefore,

enforcement

when the

State

f i l e d i t s Motion for Summary Judgment, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h a t
agency signed an a f f i d a v i t

i n d i c a t i n g t h a t no ongoing

support

payments were made t o the agency between March 1985 and April
1995. 2

Though the a f f i d a v i t contained a minor e r r o r ,

not object

t o the a f f i d a v i t

Mudd did

and i s deemed t o have waived h i s

opposition t o any e v i d e n t i a r y defect thereof. 3
2

The S t a t e acknowledges t h a t due t o an i n a d v e r t e n t e r r o r t h e
defendant was not p r o p e r l y given c r e d i t for some d i m i n u t i v e ongoing support
payments. This e r r o r would have been r e a d i l y d i s c o v e r e d had Mudd simply
t i m e l y f i l e d a response t o t h e S t a t e ' s Motion for Summary Judgment. Mudd has
now been g i v e n c r e d i t for a l l payments made.
Mudd a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t he was not c r e d i t e d for t a x refund i n t e r c e p t s made
i n 1985 and 1994. In s u p p o r t , Mudd submits a document from t h e I n t e r n a l
Revenue S e r v i c e never r a i s e d b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t , not of r e c o r d , and not
p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . N o n e t h e l e s s , for t h e b e n e f i t of t h e
Court, t h e S t a t e n o t e s t h a t any refunds i n t e r c e p t e d would have f i r s t been
a p p l i e d toward t h e o l d e s t e x i s t i n g judgments, presumably t h e two judgments
e n t e r e d i n t h e Judgment and Order Based on Acknowledgment of Voluntary
Paternity.
3

In F r a n k l i n F i n a n c i a l v . New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983), t h e Utah Supreme Court h e l d t h a t "on a motion for summary
judgment, an opposing p a r t y f a i l s t o move t o s t r i k e d e f e c t i v e a f f i d a v i t s , he
i s deemed t o have waived h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o whatever e v i d e n t i a r y d e f e c t s may
e x i s t . " c i t i n g Howick v . Bank of S a l t Lake. 498 P.2d 352 (Utah 1972); Fox v.

15

Mudd failed to timely file a response to the State's Motion
for Summary Judgment.4

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides in part, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may

not

pleading,

rest

upon

but

his

the

mere

response,

allegations
by

or

affidavits

denials
or

as

of

his

otherwise

provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.

If he does not so respond,

summary judgment. if appropriate, shall be entered against him."
(Emphasis added)
Rule 56 does not always mandate that the non-moving party
respond in order to avoid judgment against him, since the trial
court must still determine that judgment is "appropriate".
Mountain

States

Tel.

&

Tel.

Co.

v.

Atkin.

Wright

See

& Miles.

Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984); Qlwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d
585 (Utah 1982).

Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court issued the

following caution:
Thus when a party opposes a properly supported

Allstate Insurance Co.. 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969); see also Frisbee v. K & K
Constr., 676 P.2d 387, 389, 390 (Utah 1984).
4

Appellant did not file his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgement until August 7, 1995, more than 3 months after
the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and more than two weeks after
filing his Notice of Appeal.
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motion for summary judgment and fails to
file any responsive affidavits or other
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56 (e),
the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no genuine issues of fact
unless the movant's affidavit affirmatively
discloses the existence of such an issue.
Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d at 1044.
The

trial

court

properly

determined

from

the

evidence

presented that there existed no genuine issues of material fact.
Once

the

trial

appropriate,

court

the

determined

actual

amount

that

of

summary

judgment

judgment

became

a

was

simple

mathematical computation.5
On August

7,

1995, Mudd

untimely

filed

a Memorandum

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mudd's response had been timely filed, summary

in

Even if

judgment would

would have remained appropriate, though the amount of judgment
possibly adjusted.
Mudd's memorandum was not supported by any affidavits and
included

primarily

unsupported

and

false

allegations,

references to evidence not admissible or not of record.
56(e) provides that,

u

and
Rule

[a] n adverse party may not rest upon the

Judgment was entered in the amount of $12,150.00 for the period of
March 15, 1985 and April 30, 1995, a total of 121 % months at the rate of
$100.00 per month.
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mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The only genuine issue of fact included in Mudd's memorandum
was whether he had been given credit for some minor ongoing
support payments.

If Mudd had simply timely filed a response to

the

Summary

Motion

undisputed.6

for

Judgment,

this

would

have

been

Given the opportunity, the State would have filed

an amended affidavit showing the payments had been made, and this
fact would no longer have been at issue.

Therefore, this fact

would not have prevented the court from properly entering summary
judgment, though it may have slightly affected the amount of
j udgment.

POINT III
ISSUES NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DECISION
ARE NOT REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL•
Mudd i m p r o p e r l y

raises

issues

6

on a p p e a l

that

were not

ruled

See Supra f o o t n o t e 2 . Mudd a l s o r e f e r s t o an i n c o n s i s t e n c y between
t h e judgment amount sought i n t h e S t a t e ' s Motion f o r Summary Judgment and
correspondence r e c e i v e d from t h e Office of Recovery S e r v i c e s . Any
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s due p r i m a r i l y t o a e r r o n e o u s presumption by t h e agency t h a t
t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n was a p p l i c a b l e .
18

upon by the trial court.

This includes Mudd's Petition to Modify

Child Support, and Motion for Payment of Costs and Fees.

This

Court has held that "when there is no indication in the record on
appeal that the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, this
Court

will

not

undertake

to

consider

the

issue

on appeal."

Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State
v. Pacheco. 778 P. 2d 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); see also Traynor
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).

CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

State

of

Utah

respectfully

requests that this Court affirm the summary judgment entered in
its favor.
DATED this

//

day of

/^4/CJA.

, 1996.

(S^u.
COMBE

^EVEN A.
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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I hereby certify that cause to be delivered two copies of
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.vers.
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day of
1996.
ferch>

STEVEN A. C0MB1
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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DIVORCE

30-3-11

30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40K3), is, on and after the date
it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of
a district court, except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but onlyfromthe date notice of that petition was given to the obligee,
if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and
enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party
relying on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in
accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch.
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Retroactive modification.
Cited.
Retroactive modification.
The general rule is to prohibit retroactive
modification of family support obligations; thus
temporary support orders may not be retroactively modified. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836
P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Cited in McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787
P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Adelman v.
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 R2d 818 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d
1197
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Nunley v. Brooks,
247 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Spouse's right to set off debt owed
by other spouse against accrued spousal or
child support payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259.

30-3-11.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 30-3-11 (L. 1957, ch. 55,
§ 2), declaring a public policy to foster marital

and family relationships, was repealed by Laws
1961, ch. 59, § 2.
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78-12-22

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-20; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 156.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sections 78-12-18 and 78-12-19* for T h e two preceding sections" at the beginning of the section;

108

subdivided the existing single sentence into two
sentences by deleting "but a i r following "accrues" and adding "Air before "such"; and substituted "Section 78-12-21" for "the next preceding section" at the end of the section.

ARTICLE 2
OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
78-12-22. Within eight years.
Within eight years an action:
(1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of
any state or territory within the United States.
(2) to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-22; L. 1975, ch. 96, § 26; 1992,
ch. 30, § 177.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic
changes.

78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — Instrument in writing — Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
court erred in concluding that the buyer's claim
fell within the six-year period of this section.
McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

ANALYSIS

Breach of contract.
Running of statute.
—Reformation of agreements.
Breach of contract.
When a contract for the sale of land provided
no remedy in the event of the seller's default or
refusal to perform, the buyer's right to recover
money paid was not founded upon a written
instrument, but rather upon an implied right to
recover, therefore, the four-year statute of limitations in § 78-12-25(1) applied, and the trial

Running of statute.
—Reformation of agreements.
Claim for reformation of 1975 agreements
was barred by Subsection (2) of this section,
requiring actions based on a written contract to
be brought within six years. United Park City
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d
880 (Utah 1993).

78-12-25. Within four years.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of fiduciary duty.
Discovery rule.
Equitable actions.
Federal civil rights actions.
Land contract.
Negligent employment.
Personal injuries.
Product liability.
Relation back of complaints.
Running of statute.

Tax paid under protest.
Tblling.
—Class actions.
Cited.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Claim against parties for inducing, aiding,
and abetting mining corporations in breaching
their fiduciary duty was dismissed since the
acts complained of occurred more than four
years prior to the instigation of the lawsuit.
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-35

(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet barred, and also acts
retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise
barred.
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means asbestiform varieties of:
(a) chrysotile (serpentine);
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite);
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite);
(d) anthophyllite;
(e) tremolite; or
(f) actinolite.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-33.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 208, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 208 be-

came effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-12-34. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-12-34 (L. 1951, ch.
58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-34), providing
that there is no limitation in actions to recover

bank deposits of money or property, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 16, § 1.

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after
his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-35; 1987, ch. 19, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Absence" from state.
—Nonresident motorists.
Applicability of section.
—Nonresidents.
—Personal representative of estate.
Burden of proof.
Computation of time.
—Periods of absence.
Construction of section.
—Strict.
Foreign corporation.
—Pleadings and evidence.
Laches.
—Accounting.
Purpose of section.

Residence within state.
—Continual.
Proof of presence,
—Defendant's family.
—Statute tolled.
"Absence" from state.
—Nonresident motorists.
Nonresident motorists were not "absent"
from the state so as to toll running of statute of
limitations, although they left state immediately after automobile collision and remained
without state, as they had an agent in person
of secretary of state upon whom process could
have been served. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d
254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964).
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